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For more than a century, educated cities have grown more quickly than comparable cities 
with less human capital.  This fact survives a battery of other control variables, 
metropolitan area fixed effects, and tests for reverse causality.  We also find that skilled 
cities are growing because they are becoming more economically productive (relative to 
less skilled cities), not because these cities are becoming more attractive places to live.  
Most surprisingly, we find evidence suggesting that the skills-city growth connection 
occurs mainly in declining areas and occurs in large part because skilled cities are better at 
adapting to economic shocks.  As in Schultz (1964), skills appear to permit adaptation.    
 
                                                           
∗ Glaeser thanks the National Science Foundation and the Taubman Center for State and Local Government 
for financial support.  The paper was started when Saiz was an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, but the views in this paper do not necessary reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. Shannon Mail provided superb research assistance.    2
I.  Introduction 
 
Between 1980 and 2000, the population of metropolitan areas where less than 10 percent 
of adults had college degrees in 1980, grew, on average, by 13 percent.  Among 
metropolitan areas where more than 25 percent of adults had college degrees, the average 
population growth rate was 45 percent.  For more than a century, in both the United 
States and Great Britain, cities with more educated residents have grown faster than 
comparable cities with less human capital (Glaeser, 1994, Glaeser et al. 1995, Simon, 
1998, Black and Henderson, 1999, Nardinelli and Simon, 1996, 2002).   There is no 
consensus, however, on the causes or implications of this relationship.    
 
Why have people increasingly crowded around the most skilled?  Why does education 
seem to be an increasingly important ingredient in agglomeration economies?  Three 
disparate, but not incompatible, visions of the modern city offer different answers to 
these questions.  The Consumer City view (e.g. Glaeser, Kolko, Saiz, 2001)— cities are 
increasingly oriented around consumption amenities, not productivity—tells us that  
skills predict growth because skilled neighbors are an attractive consumption amenity.   
The Information City view (Jacobs, 1969)— cities exist to facilitate the flow of ideas—
tells us  we should expect cities to be increasingly oriented around the skilled because the 
skilled specialize in ideas.  The Reinvention City view (Glaeser, 2003)— cities survive 
only by adapting their economies to new technologies— tells us that human capital 
predicts city growth because human capital enables people to adapt well to change (as in   3
Schultz, 1964, Welch, 1970).  Understanding why skills predict city growth will help us 
determine if cities thrive because of consumption, information, or reinvention.       
 
In Section II of this paper, we use four approaches to address the possibility that the rise 
of the skilled city is the result of a spurious correlation between local skills and other 
urban characteristics.   First, we show that controlling for a wide range of other factors 
makes little difference to the impact of local skills on subsequent city growth and that 
local human capital is essentially orthogonal to many of the most important local 
amenities.  Second, we show that the metropolitan area human capital effect is robust to 
including metropolitan area fixed effects.  Third, we examine the connection between the 
number of colleges per capita in 1940 and growth between 1970 and 2000.  The pre-
World War II number of colleges seems considerably more exogenous than current skill 
levels, and it still correlates quite strongly with growth in the modern era.
1   
 
Fourth, we examine the timing of skills and growth and test whether skilled workers 
flock to cities that are growing.   Individuals with low education are particularly prone to 
live in declining cities (as in Glaeser and Gyourko, 2001), but exogenous differences in 
positive growth rates do not predict changes in the percentage of the population with a 
college education.  Reverse causation from growth to education seems to be present only 
in a handful of declining metropolitan areas and cannot account for much of the relevant 
effect. Overall, the evidence supports the view that skills induce growth.  
 
                                                           
1 In this we follow Moretti (2003).  Card (1995) uses proximity to college as an instrumental variable for 
the level of education of an individual.     4
In Section III of the paper, we present a framework for understanding the connection 
between skills and growth.  The framework tells us that production-led growth should 
increase nominal wages and housing prices, while consumption-led growth should cause 
real wages to fall.  Rising nominal wages are a sufficient condition for productivity 
growth, and declining real wages are necessary for the amenity story to be of relevance.   
 
Our empirical work in Section IV shows that productivity drives most of the connection 
between skills and growth.  At the metropolitan level, we find that education levels have 
a positive impact on future wage and housing price growth.  With almost any reasonable 
set of parameter values, the connection between education and population growth is the 
exclusive result of rising productivity and has less to do with rising amenity levels.  
Indeed, real wages may actually be rising in high-education metropolitan areas, which 
suggests that consumer amenities are actually declining in high skill areas.   
 
At the city level, the results are less clear. In small municipalities within metropolitan 
areas, low levels of human capital predict urban decline and falling housing prices.  At 
the city level (not at the metropolitan area level), it is the bottom end of the human capital 
distribution that matters.  High school dropouts predict urban decline.  Moreover, this 
decline appears to be driven, at least in part, through consumption-related effects. 
Perhaps, unfortunately, poverty has come to be perceived as an increasingly negative 
amenity because of social problems or a higher tax burden.   
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The fact that skills increase metropolitan area growth through productivity increases is 
compatible with both the Information City and the Reinvention City hypotheses.  In 
Section V, we try to distinguish between these two interpretations of the growth-skills 
connection.   To test the Information City hypothesis, we turn to patent data.  Previous 
research shows that areas with more human capital have higher rates of patenting per 
capita (Carlino et al., 2001).  We find that controlling for patenting rates does not explain 
any portion of the effect of human capital on growth.  This certainly does not disprove 
the Information City hypothesis, but it doesn’t support it either.   
 
One test of the reinvention hypothesis is to look at the cross-effect between skills and 
factors that have an independent effect on city growth.  The Information City view 
predicts that skills should predict growth among all types of cities.  The Reinvention City 
hypothesis predicts that skills should  matter only among those cities that have received 
negative shocks.  We test this implication by looking at the cross-effect between skills 
and the weather and between skills and immigration. Warm weather and immigration 
have been two of the most important drivers of contemporaneous metropolitan population 
growth in the United States. As Figure 4 shows, the correlation between skills and growth 
is essentially zero in warm cities.  As Figure 5 shows, the correlation coefficient between 
skills and growth is over 50 percent.   We also find that skills don’t matter much in 
immigrant cities.  There is a strong negative cross-effect between skills and either warmth 
or immigration, which means that human capital really only matters in potentially 
declining places, which in turns supports the reinvention hypothesis.   
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We also test the reinvention hypothesis by seeing whether skilled places shifted out of 
manufacturing more quickly.  In the first part of the 20
th century, urban success generally 
meant specialization in manufacturing.  Declining transport costs and declining 
importance of manufacturing has meant that at the beginning of the 21
st century, 
successful cities have moved from manufacturing into other industries.  If the reinvention 
hypothesis is right,  it should predict the speed at which cities reinvent themselves.  
Indeed, we find that metropolitan areas with high levels of education and significant 
manufacturing as of 1940 switched from manufacturing to other industries faster than 
high-manufacturing areas with less human capital.  These results suggest that skills are 
valuable because they help cities adapt and change their activities in response to negative 
economic shocks.    
 
II.  Is the Skills-Growth Connection Spurious? 
 
In this section, we confirm the empirical relationship between education and metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) growth. We test whether the connection between skills and city 
growth is spurious, reflecting omitted variables. We use both cities and MSAs as our unit 
of analysis because there are advantages and disadvantages to both.  MSAs are more 
natural labor markets, but cities are smaller and a better unit of analysis for understanding 
either amenities or real estate prices.  We use the 1999 county-based boundaries 
(NECMA definitions in New England and PMSA definitions in the rest of the country).
2  
Using county level data, we can  obtain a complete and consistent panel for 1970, 1980, 
                                                           
2 Using the most recent boundaries helps us avoid the endogeneity of current definitions to growth.  
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1990, and 2000.  We select those cities with population over 30,000 in 1970. The Data 
Appendix details the sources of all variables  
 
In Figure 1, we show the correlation between the growth of the logarithm of population 
between 1980 and 2000 and the share of adults in 1980 with college degrees among 
metropolitan statistical areas.  In Table 1 (panel a) we show the correlation between 
metropolitan area level growth and the primary independent variables over the entire 
1970-2000 period.  Table 1 (panel b) shows similar correlations at the city level. In both 
cases, there is a significant association between initial education levels and later growth.  
The correlation between the share of college graduates and population growth is 18 
percent in the case of cities and 30 percent in the case of metropolitan areas.   
 
While we focus primarily on the share of the adult population with college degrees, an 
alternative measure of human capital, the share of adults who dropped out of high school, 
is a stronger (i.e., more negative) correlate of city growth but a weaker correlate of MSA 
growth. This suggests that the impact of higher education may be more important at the 
MSA level (maybe due to a productivity effect), whereas the impact of low education is 
more important at the city level (maybe because of localized social interactions). While 
these correlations are large, other variables such as heating degree days, annual 
precipitation, and the share of labor force in manufacturing have stronger correlations 
with population growth than the human capital variables.  
   8
Our baseline regressions use a panel of metropolitan areas (in Table 2) and cities (in 
Table 3) over three periods (the 70s, the 80s and the 90s).
3 The dependent variable is the 
difference in the log of population between census years.  We focus on the coefficient on 
the share of the population with a college education.
4   All regressions include decade-
specific fixed effects and allow each geographic unit’s standard errors to be correlated 
over time.  More precisely, we estimate the coefficients β  and  j γ  in regressions of the 
form: 
(1)      
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 is the share of the population with a college degree in the initial 
year,  10 , , − t j i Z  is the value of independent variable j in the initial year,  t Y  is a decade-
specific fixed effect, and  t i, ε  is the city-year error term, which we allow to be correlated 
across decades.    
 
Regression (1) in Tables 2 and 3 shows the raw impact of percent college educated on 
later growth for MSAs and cities, respectively.  In the case of the MSA-level regressions, 
a one-percentage-point increase in the share of the adult population with college degrees 
increases the decadal growth rate by, approximately,  almost one-half of 1 percent.  The 
standard deviation of metropolitan area growth is approximately 0.1 and the standard 
deviation of the college graduation variable is approximately 0.05:  a one-standard-
                                                           
3 We have data for four years: 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Since we are using population growth (the first 
difference in the log of population), we end up with three time periods. 
4 This corresponds to individuals with a bachelor’s degree.   9
deviation increase in percent college graduates increases the expected growth rate by one-
quarter of a standard deviation.   
 
In the city-level regressions reported in Table 3, the basic effect of college education is 
weaker.  A 1 percent increase in college graduates increases the expected growth rate by 
one-fifth of 1 percent.  At the city level, the standard deviation of the percent college 
educated variable is approximately 0.1, and the standard deviation of decadal growth 
rates is about 0.15.  This means that a one-standard-deviation increase in the percent 
college educated at the city level is associated with approximately  one-seventh of a 
standard deviation increase in the expected growth rate.  As suggested by the raw 
correlations, college education is a more powerful predictor of growth at the MSA level 
than growth at the city level.   
 
In regression (2) of both tables, we include initial population, the log of heating degree 
days, the log of average precipitation, the share of labor force in manufacturing, trade and 
professional services,
5 and controls for the four census regions.  Warm and dry weather 
have been shown to be among the important predictors of population growth in the 
United States at the end of the 20
th century (Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz, 2001, Glaeser and 
Shapiro, 2003). Heating degree days is a measure of cold weather severity (roughly, how 
many days would a household need to use heating to keep warm).  Initial population is 
usually unrelated to later city growth (as in Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer, 1995, 
Eaton and Eckstein, 1997), but it remains a natural control.  The employment share 
                                                           
5 These are the three major occupations in our sample, representing 63 percent of total MSA employment in 
1990.   10
variables capture aspects of industrial orientation, and we know from Table 1 that 
specializing in manufacturing is a strong correlate of later decline.     
 
For both cities and metropolitan areas we find that warm, dry places grow much more 
quickly than cold, wet places.  There is a modest amount of mean reversion:  bigger cities 
and metropolitan areas grow somewhat more slowly.  Metropolitan areas with substantial 
manufacturing grow more slowly.  While these correlations are interesting, we will not 
discuss them further because they have been considered at length elsewhere (Glaeser, 
Scheinkman and Shleifer, 1995, Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003).  Our focus is the extent to 
which  controlling for these variables changes the impact of college education on later 
city growth. 
 
Including these controls has little impact on the coefficient on the college educated.   
Education does not predict growth because educated metropolitan areas have more 
employment in the service sector or better weather.  In the case of metropolitan areas, 
including these factors actually causes the coefficient on percent college educated to rise.  
The fact that controlling for these major potential omitted variables causes the impact of 
college to rise shouldn’t surprise us, because skilled workers are actually less likely to 
live in warm, dry places.  Since more educated people have tended to live in  areas of the 
country with less desirable climates, controlling for the weather variables makes the 
impact of education stronger, not weaker.   
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In specification three, we include state-specific fixed effects.  In principle, these fixed 
effects should capture all time-invariant weather or geographic variables, as well as those 
state-level policies that change only slowly over time.  In Tables 2 and 3, controlling for 
state-specific effects has only a modest impact.  In the case of metropolitan areas, the 
state fixed effects regressions have almost exactly the same coefficient as the regression 
with no controls.  In the case of cities, the state fixed effects cause the coefficient on 
education to drop 18 percent relative to the no control specification.  We generally prefer 
not to work with state specific fixed effects, especially in the case of metropolitan area 
regressions, since many states have only a small number of metropolitan areas.   
   
In the fourth regression, we include a city or metropolitan area fixed effect.  This control 
is meant to address the possibility that skilled workers are just proxying for omitted 
variables that are pushing the area ahead.  In this case, all of our identification comes 
from changes in the share of college educated over time within the city.  In other words, 
during decades in which the city began with more college graduates (relative to its 
historical mean), did that city have a higher subsequent growth rate?  In the case of 
metropolitan areas, these fixed effects have little impact on the coefficient, although the 
standard errors rise significantly.
6  In the case of the cities, the coefficient drops by 40 
percent (relative to the no control benchmark) and becomes statistically insignificant, but 
the difference between the coefficient in regression (4) and the coefficient in regression 
(1) is not statistically significant.   
                                                           
6 We understand that we cannot estimate the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable consistently in 
the fixed effects specification. However, the results on the other coefficients would not change very much 
if we omitted the lag of population in the fixed effects specification. 
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Including city-specific fixed effects is asking a great deal of the data, given the extremely 
high degree of persistence in human capital over time.  The correlation coefficient in the 
share of the college educated in 1980 and 1990 is 97.3 percent across cities and 97.5 
percent across metropolitan areas.  As the fixed effects eliminate most of the variation in 
skills across space, we are amazed that we continue to find a positive effect, and we are 
not troubled that the effect gets somewhat weaker in the city specification.   
  
In the fifth regressions of the two tables, we add two further controls to the specification 
in regression (2): share of the adult population without high school degree and the 
unemployment rate.  We see both of these variables as added measures of human capital, 
but these measures capture the lower end of the human capital distribution.  While high-
frequency changes in the unemployment rate over time generally reflect time-varying 
labor market conditions, differences in the unemployment rate across cities (less so across 
metropolitan areas) are generally time invariant and reflect characteristics of the labor 
force and the industry structure in the city.
7  The correlation coefficient between city-
level unemployment rates in 1980 and 1990 is 0.75; the correlation coefficient between 
MSA-level unemployment rates in 1980 and 1990 is 0.5.   
 
In the case of metropolitan areas, the effect of the dropout rate is insignificant and the 
unemployment rate is marginally significant.  Together these variables reduce the 
coefficient on percent college educated by 15 percent relative to regression (1).  In Table 
                                                           
7 Thus most of the time-series variation in unemployment rates is common to all cities, whereas the relative 
differentials between cities are quite stable.   13
3, controlling for these other variables severely reduces the impact of higher education on 
city growth.  The natural interpretation of Table 2 and Table 3 is that an abundance of 
college graduates drives the success of a regional labor market, but a local neighborhood 
succeeds by avoiding large numbers of low educated workers.   It seems that having high 
human capital matters most for the metropolitan area, but avoiding low human capital 
matters more for smaller units of geography.   
 
Finally, in regression (6), we drop our measure of college graduation entirely and follow 
Moretti (2003) using instead the presence of colleges in the area prior to 1940.  As seen 
in Figure 2, there is a remarkably strong relationship between the number of colleges per 
capita before World War II and the level of people with higher education in 2000. This 
variable has the advantage of being predetermined and not a function of recent events that 
might attract the well educated to a metropolitan area.   
 
While we believe that this variable is less likely to reflect reverse causality or omitted 
factors than our share of college-educated variable, we are not confident that it is 
orthogonal to the error term.  As such, using the variable as an instrument (as in Moretti, 
2003) may give us quite misleading results because in instrumental variables regression, 
the correlation with the error term is essentially multiplied by the inverse of the first stage 
R-squared.
8  Instead, we present results using this variable directly instead of using it to 
instrument for the share of college graduates.  In fact, both as an instrument and as a 
right-hand-side variable, the variable has a strong, significant impact on population 
                                                           
8 Technically, this statement is only true in a univariate regression.  Still, the basic point that correlation 
with the error term explodes in magnitude in instrumental variables regressions holds in all cases.     14
growth.  The coefficient in Table 2 implies that as the number of colleges per capita 




In Appendix Table 2 we run similar regressions at the MSA level with a set of controls 
for other variables that may be correlated with initial high levels of education and find 
that the impact of education on growth is not driven by these omitted variables either.
10   
 
In Table 4, we look at reverse causality.   In regression (1), we look at the relationship 
between population growth and the change in the share of the population with bachelor’s 
degrees at the city level.  Glaeser and Gyourko (2001) argue that durable housing causes 
uneducated people to move into declining cities for the cheap housing.  As such, the 
relationship between population change and human capital change should be much 
                                                           
9 We have also experimented with college enrollment over population in 1970 as an exogenous proxy for 
human capital with qualitatively similar results (see Appendix Table 2, column 1). 
10 In Appendix Table 2 we control for the possibility that the share of the highly educated may be simply 
capturing attributes of the age distribution in a city (for example, younger cities will tend to be more 
educated because of a cohort effect: younger cohorts are attaining higher education levels, or cities with 
lower education may be simply cities with elderly retired people). To address that issue we have augmented 
the MSA regression to control for the initial age distribution of the metropolitan area (variables for the 
shares of population in the following categories: age 0-21,22-34,35-44,45-54, and 54-65). We include in 
Appendix Table 2 other variables that are generally considered city amenities or disamenities. We also 
control for the murder rate. Higher education levels have been shown to reduce crime (Lochner, 1999, 
Lochner and Moretti, 2001).  Crime is a very salient disamenity. For instance, Berry-Cullen  and Levitt, 
(1999) show a causal link between crime and city depopulation. Murder rates are a good indicator of crime, 
because other crimes are not always reported, and reporting rates for other crimes may vary according to 
education levels. The number of museums, eating and drinking establishments per capita, health 
establishments per capita, the number of amusement and recreational service establishments, and the 
teacher/pupil ratio (a proxy for the quality of primary and secondary education in the metropolitan area) are 
included as local public goods or amenities that are likely to be provided in high human capital areas. We 
also include the number of membership organizations as a proxy for social capital. An alternative 
hypothesis to explain why the presence of highly educated people fosters growth hinges on the propensity 
of the highly educated to contribute to local social capital by participating in political and civic institutions 
(à la Putnam, 2000).  Including these amenities, public goods, and controls for social capital does not seem 
to explain away the role of education on city growth. In fact, the amenity variables are mostly insignificant 
in this specification, although in line with previous research there is a very strong negative impact of crime 
on growth.   15
weaker among growing cities than among declining cities. This asymmetry occurs 
because durable housing means that housing prices fall sharply in declining cities and this 
attracts the unskilled.  We estimate our regression with a spline at zero population 
growth.      
 
Regression (1) does indeed find a strong relationship between growth and human capital 
among declining cities and little relationship among growing cities.  In regression (4) we 
repeat this exercise with metropolitan areas and find similar results.  Regressions (2) and 
(5) repeat regressions (1) and (4) with initial population and industry share controls and 
find little change in the coefficients on growth.   
 
While these regressions point to a connection between decline and human capital change, 
the fact that we are regressing change in human capital on contemporaneous population 
growth is problematic.  Obviously, the causal link is hard to determine from this 
regression.  To address this issue, we instrument for growth using the omitted climate 
variables (heating days and annual precipitation).  As shown above, these variables 
powerfully predict growth, and we use them as instruments in regressions (3) and (6).  
Clearly, interpreting the coefficients from the IV specification would become problematic 
if we believed that climate has a direct impact on the skill composition of an area.  In 
regressions (3) and (6), the results are inconclusive, because the standard errors become 
quite large (especially for the coefficients on decline), but we see little evidence for 
population growth accompanying skill upgrading among growing cities.   
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Our interpretation of Table 4 is that there is significant potential for reverse causality 
among those cities that are actually in decline but little potential for reverse causality 
among growing cities.  We see this as being more problematic for the city-level 
regressions because decline is more common at the city level.  To ensure that a tendency 
for declining metropolitan areas to shed skilled workers is not driving our results in 
Tables 2 and 3, we have run regressions where we treat all declining cities as having zero 
population growth.  This change has little impact on our estimated coefficient on 
schooling.  We also omitted those areas that are predicted (on the basis of weather) to 
have population declines.  This causes our coefficients to fall, but they generally remain 
statistically significant.  
 
III.  Productivity and Amenities: A Theoretical Framework 
 
Tables 2, 3, and 4 suggest that the correlation between human capital and subsequent 
urban growth is a real phenomenon and not a spurious correlation driven by some 
obvious omitted variable or reverse causality.  We now try to understand this correlation.  
In this section, we present a simple model that will help us to distinguish between 
consumption- and production-led urban growth.  The main novelty of the model is to 
extend the framework of Glaeser et al. (1995) to multiple skill groups.    
 
The spatial equilibrium concept is the appropriate starting point for empirical work on 
urban growth.  This concept posits that identical people must be indifferent between 
alternative locations.  We assume that there are a large number of cities, and we consider   17
the equilibrium of a single city, denoted “j.”  There are two types of workers, high skill 
and low skill, who receive different wages in the city, denoted 
H
j W  and 
L
j W .     
 
Utility is Cobb-Douglas over a traded good, a non-traded good, and over a place-specific 
commodity, and as such, consumers choose the consumption of the non-traded good 
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j P  is the price of that good in 
city j, and  j C  is a city-specific consumer amenity level. Optimization yields 
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j W Q P γ = .  We assume a fixed supply of the non-traded good in city “j” which is 
denoted  j Q .  If we let  j N  denote total city population and  j W ˆ  denote the average wage, 
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equal to  i U , the reservation utility for each group H and L.  This implies that the ratio of 













We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function that uses capital (denoted K), effective 
labor units (denoted L and defined later), and a city-specific production input (which is 
meant to represent commercial land or access to waterways and is denoted F).  Total 
output is therefore  β α β α − − 1 F L K Aj , where  j A  is a city-specific productivity factor.     
Capital is available at a national price of r, but there is only a fixed amount, j F , of the 
city-specific input.   18
 
Our primary focus will be on changes in the productivity level,  j A , and the consumer 
amenity level, j C , and these are the only city-specific attributes that we will allow to 










































 + , where  k
t j X ,  are city-specific characteristics as of time t, 
which include the skill composition of the city.  There are two interpretations of these 
equations.  First, different variables may actually increase productive innovation or 
investment in consumer amenities.  In this case, we should think of estimated coefficients 
as suggesting that certain characteristics have growth effects.    
 
Alternatively, we can think of characteristics as having level effects that change over 
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+ .  As these equations are identical to the 
growth equations above, they are empirically indistinguishable, and we cannot tell if a 
characteristic causes productivity growth because it has a growth effect or because it has 
a level effect that is increasing over time.  This model will enable us to separate   19
characteristics that impact consumption amenities and characteristics that impact 
production amenities, but not to separate growth effects from “increasing level” effects.    
 
To allow for multiple skill categories, we assume that a unit of effective labor is produced 
via a constant elasticity of substitution technology that uses both high- and low-skilled 
workers, i.e.  ()
σ σ σ σ θ
/ 1 1
L H j L L L + =
−  where  j θ  is a city-specific parameter increasing the 
relative returns to skilled workers, and  H L ,  L L  reflect the number of high- and low-skill 
workers, respectively.  Cost minimization implies  σ
σ





























= φ  so the skill composition of the city is determined by the parameter  j θ .   
Manipulation of the first order conditions and using the notation  γβ β α η + − − =1 
implies:  
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j Θ  for i=N, W, Q refers to city-specific terms that are only a function of  j θ  and  
φ , and where  i Ω  i=N, W, Q refers to terms that are common across cities, including the   20
reservation utilities, rent level, and the parameters, α , β , γ  and σ .  Both  i
N Θ  and  N Ω  
are defined in Appendix B.   
 
Equations (2), (3) and (4) yield standard results in the regional literature: (1) increases in 
urban productivity will cause increases in the population, average wages, and the price of 
non-traded goods (i.e., housing), (2) increases in the fixed factor of production will 
likewise increase population, wages, and the price of non-traded goods, (3) increases in 
the consumption amenity will raise population, lower wages, and raise housing prices and 
(4) increases in the endowment of non-traded goods will increase the population, 
decrease wages, and decrease the price of the non-traded good. 
 
To manipulate these equations, we will assume that, within a city, the production and 
consumption amenities are changing over time, that all other city-specific factors are 





 is fixed.  These 
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where 
i I  for i=N, W, Q is an intercept term that is constant across cities, and  i
t j, µ  again 
for i=N, W, Q is an error term, which has a zero mean and is orthogonal to the X terms as 
long as the underlying error terms,  i
t j, µ   are mean zero and orthogonal to the X terms.   
 
Equations (2′), (3′), and (4′) show us how to use the differences in the coefficients from 
population, wage, and price growth regressions to determine the values of  
k
A δ  and  k
C δ  
for any X variable.  The intuition behind this claim is that if a variable is increasing 
population and prices, but not wages, this implies that the variable is increasing 
consumption amenities.  If a variable is correlated with increasing population and wages, 
more than with prices,  this implies that the variable is increasing productivity.   
 
We focus on a specific X variable— the share of skilled workers, which is itself a 
function of the ratio of reservation utility levels and the technology parameter  j θ .  We 
will let 
S
A δ  and  S
C δ  refer to the impact of this variable on the growth of productivity and 
consumption amenities, respectively.  These equations will enable us to interpret the city-
growth regressions (shown above) and regressions looking at changes in urban wages and 
changes in housing values.    
 
Under the assumptions of the model, different values of  j θ  will have no direct impact on 










 rises,  we should   22
expect skilled cities to grow less.   The intuition behind this result is a pure price effect.  
For cities that specialize in the skilled, their primary form of labor has become more 
expensive, and as a result, they grow less.    To understand these issues fully, a general 
equilibrium model would be necessary.  For our purposes, though, it is enough to note 





 (reflecting, perhaps, the rising skill premium) would cause 
relatively less population growth in more skilled cities.    
 
Using calculations in the Appendix and the notation  Pop B ˆ ,  ice BPr ˆ   and  Wage B ˆ  to denote 
the coefficients on schooling in population growth, housing price growth and wage 
growth regressions, respectively,  it follows that: 
 



































































Equation (5) tells us that if we want to determine the reason why skills increase 
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 the ratio of producer spending on labor divided by producing 
spending on labor and non-traded capital goods.     23
     
IV.  Distinguishing Between Productivity and Amenity Effects 
 
We now use the equations in the previous section to measure the extent to which the 
connection between skill and growth stems from productivity or amenity effects.  Since 
Rauch (1993) we have known that, holding one’s own skill level constant, wages in a city 
rise with the skill level of that community.  We also know that prices are higher in both 
cities and metropolitan areas with more skilled workers.  Moretti (2003) extends Rauch 
(1993) and identifies human capital externalities by using instrumental variables related 
to human capital but plausibly exogenous to wages.
11 He finds that, after controlling for 
the private returns to education, a 1-percentage-point increase in the share of the college 
educated in a metropolitan area raises average wages by 0.6 percent-1.2 percent. The 
same author (Moretti, 2002) finds more direct evidence of human capital externalities by 
using plant-level production functions.  Of course, it is arguable if the previous literature 
succeeds in addressing the problem that selection of more unobservable skilled workers 
into these cities might be driving the correlations.   
 
In Figure 3, we show the relationship between wages, adjusted for both individual 
characteristics and local prices and local human capital across metropolitan areas in 1990.  
The individual characteristics include age, schooling, and gender, and we have used the 
American Chamber of Commerce Research Analysis data to correct for local price levels.  
The overall correlation is strong and positive.  If we believe these price levels, it seems 
                                                           
11 He uses the demographic structure of the city and the presence of “land-grant” colleges from the Morrill 
Act (1862).   24
appropriate to think that in the cross-section, the primary impact of human capital is to 
increase productivity, at least at the metropolitan area level. 
 
Our focus is, of course, on changes over time, not on the level effects.  So to address 
these changes we turn first to results looking at housing price growth at the city and 
metropolitan area levels.  We are implicitly assuming that the relative home quality 
changes across metropolitan areas are small.  The available evidence supports the idea 
that this assumption is not particularly problematic.  Table 5 (panels A and B) reproduces 
Tables 2 and 3 with the change in the logarithm of median housing values as the 
dependent variable.  These are self-reported housing values taken from the census. In 
these regressions, we add the initial housing values as an added control to correct for 
mean reversion.   
 
Regressions (1)-(6) of Panel A in Table 5 show the impact that initial human capital has 
on later housing price appreciation at the metropolitan area level.  The magnitude of the 
effect expands dramatically between regression (1) and regression (2) as the coefficient 
on percent college educated rises from 0.18 to 1.17.   If we believe the coefficient in 
regression (1),  a 10 percent increase in the percent college educated at the metropolitan 
area level is associated with a 1.8 percent increase in housing prices over the next decade.  
If we believe the coefficient in regression (2),  a 10 percent increase in the percent 
college educated increases the expected growth rate of housing prices  almost 12 percent 
over the next decade.   
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The difference between the two coefficients is entirely the result of controlling for the 
initial housing price in each community.  There is an extraordinarily large amount of 
mean reversion in housing prices across metropolitan areas.  In general, the high price 
areas have also had higher levels of human capital, so controlling for the natural tendency 
of high price places to mean revert causes the coefficient on initial share with college 
degrees to increase.   
 
Regressions (3)-(6) show that at the metropolitan area level the coefficient on schooling 
in housing price growth regressions is extraordinarily robust statistically when we control 
for initial housing price.   Even with state or metropolitan area fixed effects, the t-statistic 
never drops below four.  Regression (6) shows that the presence of colleges prior to 1940 
also predicts housing price growth during the past 30 years.  Panel A in Table 5 certainly 
seems to make it clear that higher levels of education increase both the population of 
metropolitan areas and the price that this population is paying for the privilege of living 
in the area.   
 
In Panel B (Table 5), we examine housing price growth at the city level, and the results 
essentially reproduce the findings of Panel A.  Housing price growth is weakly positively 
associated with human capital when we fail to control for initial housing prices.  When 
we control for mean reversion, the effect becomes extremely large and extremely robust.  
The only substantive difference between Panel A and B is that in Panel B, the presence of 
colleges prior to 1940 is not a good predictor of housing price growth over the last 30   26
years.  We are certainly struck by the extraordinary power of human capital in predicting 
housing price growth.   
 
In Panels C and D (Table 5), we look at the connection between income growth and 
human capital.  Panels C and D essentially reproduce Tables 2 and 3 with the log of 
family income as the dependent variable.  These regressions are useful in that they are 
directly comparable to the previous regressions, but they are flawed by the fact that these 
results will be biased because of the rise in returns to skill over this time period.  Because 
the compensation for skilled workers has generally risen over the period, we should 
expect to see incomes rising more quickly in more skilled cities.  Average family income, 
or other aggregate income measures, cannot control for the general change in skill 
premia.  Nevertheless, for completeness we present these results. 
 
Panels C and D show a systematic positive relationship between initial human capital 
levels and later growth in family income at both the metropolitan area and city levels.  As 
in Panels A and B, there is a big difference in the coefficients between regressions (1) 
and (2) (in both Panels C and D) where the coefficient on schooling is much bigger in 
regression (2).  Just as in the case of housing prices, there is substantial mean reversion in 
family incomes, and just as in the case of housing prices, skilled cities look much better 
once we account for this natural tendency of high income places to become relatively 
poorer over time.   
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In both Panels C and D, the baseline impact of having an extra 10 percent of an area’s 
adult population with college degrees is an increase in expected income growth of 2 
percent.  When we control for mean reversion, that impact increases to more than 10 
percent.  Given that wages for workers with college degrees expanded (relative to non-
college degree workers) by less than 50 percent over the entire 30-year period (see Katz 
and Murphy, 1992), the pure compositional effect of a 10-percentage-point increase in 
the share of adults with a college degree should be less than 2 percent per decade.  Using 
a back-of-the-envelope estimate, if workers of category “X” have had their wages 
increase by “Y” percent over a time period, then an upper bound for the purely 
compositional effect of having an extra 10 percent of a place’s labor force in category 
“X” is .1*Y.
12  Thus, the large magnitudes of the effects seem incompatible with the view 
that the only effect is that skilled workers are getting higher wages: workers in skilled 
cities are getting paid more relative to skilled workers elsewhere.
13  
 
To show this, in Table 6 column 1, we use the Census Individual Public Use 
Microsamples (IPUMS) from 1970 to 2000 to control for individual characteristics in a 
wage regression that includes MAS education levels.  We look at the wages of males over 
21, and we control for schooling, age and race, and metropolitan area fixed effects.  In 
these regressions, the coefficients on schooling and age were allowed to differ by time 
period.  We also include a control for the schooling in the area.  We decided to use the 
lagged share of the percent of the area with college degrees as our measure of education.  
                                                           
12 The initial share of the highly educated may also be positively correlated with changes in that share. The 
micro-data regressions will dispel any concerns in that direction.    28
The decision to use lagged value is both an attempt to make these results more 
comparable with the growth regressions and also an attempt to reduce the causality 
problems inherent with regressing wages on the population composition of an area.   
While this would certainly not eliminate causal issues, our results are essentially 
unchanged if we use schooling in 1970 as our measure of MSA schooling throughout the 
time period.   
 
Since we are controlling for metropolitan area fixed effects, we can only estimate the 
coefficient on area-level schooling in three decades, and we chose 1970 as the excluded 
decade.  As such, differences in our estimated coefficients on the interaction of schooling 
and decade should be interpreted as the extent to which the coefficient on average 
schooling in the area has increased over time.  Our results suggest that the coefficient on 
schooling increased by 0.58 between 1970 and 1980, and then by 0.21 between 1980 and 
1990.  Between 1990 and 2000 the coefficient increased by 0.047.   
 
On average over the three decades, the coefficient on the share with college degrees 
increased by 0.25 per decade, which is comparable to a coefficient in a growth regression 
of 0.25.  This is comparable to the coefficient in the first regressions of Table 5 (Panels C 
and D), not the subsequent regressions, because Table 6 doesn’t allow high wage cities to 
mean revert and become lower wage over time.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 The results cannot be accounted for by the fact that more highly educated people have a higher 
propensity to be married and thus higher (median)  family incomes: using income per capita at the MSA 
level we found very similar results.   29
In the second column of Table 6, we include housing value regressions that are similar in 
character to the wage regressions.  In this case, we are able to control for housing 
characteristics and thus  for any changes in the hedonic value of housing characteristics 
over time.  Just as in the wage regression, we are able to control for metropolitan area 
fixed effects and we identify a tendency of the houses in high schooling metropolitan 
areas to increase over time.  On average, the coefficient on schooling rises by over 0.5 
each decade over the 30 years, but all of this increase occurs between 1970 and 1990.  
Between 1990 and 2000, the coefficient on schooling actually falls.   
 
Interpreting the Coefficients with the Model 
 
We first focus on metropolitan areas and then turn to cities and begin with our estimates 
of  Pop B ˆ ,  ice BPr ˆ   and  Wage B ˆ .  At the metropolitan area level, the coefficient of schooling 
in the Table 2 population growth regressions ranges from 0.42 to 0.58.   This is a fairly 
narrow band and not much is gained by focusing on the extremes, as such we will use 0.5 
as value of  Pop B ˆ . 
 
The estimates of  ice BPr ˆ  in Table 5 range from 0.2 to 2.4, but the bulk of them are 
clustered around 1.  In Table 9 our estimate of  ice BPr ˆ  is 0.55.  We will use 0.5 and 0.75 
as two estimates of  ice BPr ˆ .  Table 5 gives a range of estimates for  Wage B ˆ  between 0.2 and 
1.8.  In the case of Wage B ˆ , we are inclined to put more weight on Table 6’s estimate of 
0.25, since this is the only estimate that controls properly for individual characteristics.       30
 
To produce a reasonable set of estimates, we rely on the fact that the model implies that 
Pop B ˆ + Wage B ˆ = ice BPr ˆ , the sum of the coefficients on wages and population should equal 
the coefficient on prices.  It is not true that this holds perfectly empirically—for Table 6’s 
estimates and for the estimates in regressions (2), (4) and (5) of Table 5, the value of 
ice BPr ˆ - Wage B ˆ  ranges from 0.3-0.5.  The two cases where the difference is outside  this 
range are the case where there are no controls and the case where we have state fixed 
effects.   So we will calibrate the model with a range of 0.1 to 0.5 for  Wage B ˆ  and an 















 ranges from 0.2 to 1.   
 
Equation (5) tells us that if we want to determine the reason why skills increase 
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-- the share of spending on non-traded goods 
divided by one minus the same share.  We can estimate this parameter by using the 2001 
Consumer Expenditure Survey to calibrate the share of shelter in overall expenditure,   31
which is 0.19.  Shelter is pretty clearly a non-traded good, but as there are other elements 
of consumption that are non-traded, this estimate qualifies as something of a lower 
bound.   
 




 is to use a city-level price index (from the American 
Chamber of Commerce) and regress the log of this price index on the log of housing 
prices.  If the Cobb-Douglas assumption is correct, and if we assume that the 
consumption amenity is constant then:   ()
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.  Since price indices are supposed to measure the amount of money 
needed to provide a fixed level of utility, they are ideally the expenditure function, so 
another way of estimating γ   is to estimate
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 (i.e. the extent that local price 
levels rise with increases in housing prices).  Using the 2000 cross-section, we estimate:  
 
(6) Log(Price Level)=   -2.2   +   .29*Log(Median Housing Price) 
        (18)        (.015) 
 
The R-squared is 0.63, and there are 220 observations.  We can also estimate this 
relationship from a panel with MSA and year dummies: 
 
(6′)  Log(Price Level)=MSA and Year Dummies + .21*Log(Median Housing Value) 
              (0.028) 
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In this case, the R-squared is 0.986, and there are 505 observations.  Together, these two 
methods confirm that a reasonable estimate of the share of spending on non-traded goods 
lies between 0.21 and 0.29, and we will use 0.33 
0.25
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 equals the ratio of producer spending on labor divided by producer 
spending on labor plus producer spending on non-traded capital goods.  While we lack 
any compelling figures for this ratio, we don’t believe that spending on non-traded capital 
goods can be more than one-third of the wage bill.  Thus, this parameter is bounded 
between 0.75 and 1.   
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 is 0.6.  To believe that the 

















.  We don’t believe that either of those conditions 
hold and as such, we are led to the view that the bulk of the skills-growth connection at 
the metropolitan area level comes from the fact that skills predict productivity growth.   
 
As a final check on this, in Table 7, we look at the growth of real wages and the 
relationship to initial human capital.  As argued before, if human capital increases 
amenities at the metropolitan area level, then real wages should be falling.  We again use 
the American chamber of Commerce data for local prices levels.  We use three different 
measures of MSA-level wages.  First, we use the census’ average wage in the area.  
Second, we use the average manufacturing wage in the area from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.  Third, we use a wage variable that we construct using data from the Individual 
Public Use Micro-Sample, which corresponds to the MSA fixed effect of a regression of 
wages on individual characteristics. This can be interpreted as the average wage in the 
metropolitan area net of the impact of individual characteristics.  We present results both 
with and without other controls.  In all cases, we find either a positive or a zero 
coefficient on human capital.  There is no regression where human capital is associated 
with declining real wages at the city level.  This evidence again pushes us to the 
conclusion that rising wages at the city level have everything to do with rising 
productivity and nothing to do with rising amenities.   
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Results at the City Level 
 
We can distinguish between the impact of human capital on the growth of metropolitan 
areas and the impact of human capital on the growth of cities (holding metropolitan area 
growth constant).  The overall growth of cities is driven by factors similar  to those that 
drive growth in the metropolitan areas that surround them.  The growth of cities holding 
metropolitan area growth constant enables us to really focus on city-specific factors.  
There has been little work on this issue, but in many respects, it is a natural area for 
research on amenities.  Cities within a metropolitan area have radically different levels of 
amenities but supposedly are part of the same labor market.  After all, metropolitan areas 
are defined to capture a local labor market.   Moreover, many people work outside of 
their city (within their metropolitan area), but their city still determines their quality of 
life, their housing prices, and their public goods. 
 
Within the context of the previous model, if we assume that wages are the same across 
cities (within a metropolitan area), then  ( )
γ − Q
j j P C   must be constant across areas, i.e. the 
price of the non-traded good (housing) must offset the value of a higher level of 
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where 
Q
MSA I  is an MSA-specific intercept, and  k
C δ
~
 represents the impact of characteristic 
k on consumption amenity growth at the local level, which may be slightly different from 
the impact of the growth of this variable at the MSA level. 
 












.  If 
we use the notation that  j S  denotes the share of population in the city that is highly 





















C 1  is constant within a 
metropolitan area.  In this case, the model does not pin down the skill composition of the 
city or the population of the city, only the city’s aggregate income. In principle the city 
can include only skilled workers or only unskilled workers or any combination of the 
two.  To implement this empirically, we assume that  ( )
γ φ
− + j S 1   is constant over time, 






























MSA I  is an MSA-specific intercept.  Somewhat surprisingly, the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function implies that the effect of consumption amenity growth on prices and 
people should be the same.   
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Equations (2′′) and (4′′) inspire us to run regressions within metropolitan areas controlling 
for MSA/decade fixed effects.  These are shown in Table 8 and the regressions should be 
interpreted as capturing the impact of city-specific human capital controlling for the 
average growth rate of the metropolitan area over the decade.  The first thing that the 
regressions show is that the impact of human capital on prices and population is not the 
same, despite the implications of the model.  Human capital has a much stronger effect 
(at least when we control for initial price levels) on price growth than on population 
growth. 
 
The second implication of the regressions is that human capital powerfully predicts both 
housing price and population growth.  Interestingly, the impact of the highly educated 
residents (college graduates shown in regressions (1) and (3)) is stronger in the housing 
price growth regressions.  High human capital workers appear to be highly correlated 
with rising prices.  The impact of less educated residents (high school dropouts shown in 
regressions (2) and (4)) is stronger in the population growth regressions.  All four 
regressions can be interpreted to mean that human capital is associated with rising 
consumer amenity levels at the local level, but the regressions do not tell us a simple 
story. 
 
One possible way to reconcile these regressions is to drop our simple assumptions about 
housing supply being essentially perfectly elastic (subject to the constraint of the fixed 
amount of non-traded commodity).  Indeed, the impact of housing supply is the most 
important missing element in understanding city growth.  If we assume  there are limits to   37
new construction, such as zoning or land use regulation, and we assume that these were 
more binding in high skill, rather than low skill cities, then we might expect this pattern.  
In high skill cities, supply is relatively inelastic so increasing demand operates mainly by 
increasing prices.  In low skill cities, supply is more elastic, so increasing demand 
operates mainly by increasing quantities.  This is a possible reconciliation of the four 
regressions in Table 8, but it properly belongs as a subject for future research. 
 
If we accept the assumption that a metropolitan area is a common labor market, with 
common wages, then Table 8 seems to imply that there is a significant impact of skills on 
consumption amenity growth at the local level.  Of course, that assumption may not hold 
perfectly.  Some sub areas of a metropolitan region may be much more productive than 
others, and productivity heterogeneity could explain the results.  As such, these findings 
are best thought of as suggestive evidence supporting the link between skills and amenity 
growth at the local level.        
 
V.  Understanding the Productivity Effect 
 
The evidence suggests that the skills-growth connection at the metropolitan area is fueled 
primarily by productivity effects.  As suggested earlier, the basic data on wage, price and 
population growth cannot distinguish between different stories concerning the connection 
between human capital and productivity.  However, we will use other available evidence 
to check the validity of two of these stories.   38
First, we address the hypothesis that an environment dense with highly educated people 
leads to faster technological innovation and that this explains the connection between 
metropolitan area growth and human capital.  To test this idea, we turn to the patents 
data.  We are able to measure patents by MSA for the period 1990-1999, so we will focus 
on growth during the 1990s. We first regress patents per capita on the human capital 
level,  then see how much of the skills-growth connection is explained by greater 
patenting activity.   
 
In Table 9, regression 1, we find (like Carlino, Chatterjee and Hunt, 2001) that the share 
with bachelor’s degree is an important predictor of technological growth. We find that a 
10 percent in increase the share of college graduates increases the number of patents by 
0.09 log points (approximately 9 percent).  This certainly supports the idea that the better 
educated are more technologically innovative. 
 
Moreover, in regression (2), we show that there is a connection between patents and 
growth in regressions where we don’t control for human capital.  Of course, no causality 
is posited by these regressions.  Patents are as much a sign of a healthy urban 
environment as a cause.  However, the important fact is shown in regression (3).  Once 
we control for human capital there is no meaningful relationship between patents and 
urban growth.  As such, human capital may matter because it makes people more 
creative, but the important elements of this creativity must be in areas beyond the formal 
patenting sector.   
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The Reinvention Hypothesis 
 
We finally turn to the puzzle created by Figures 4 and 5: human capital predicts growth 
much more sharply in cold places than in warm areas. Figure 4 shows the relatively mild 
(0.13) correlation between skills and growth among those metropolitan areas with 
January temperatures above 40 degrees on average. Figure 5 shows the 47 percent 
correlation between the initial share of the population with college degrees and the 
growth of the logarithm of population between 1980 and 2000 for those metropolitan 
areas with average January temperatures below 40 degrees. The regression (reported in 
the figure) suggests that as the share of college educated increases by 1 percent, the 
growth rate of the period increases by 1.3 percent.   Previous literature (Glaeser, Kolko, 
and Saiz, 2001, Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003) has pointed to the role of warm weather as an 
exogenous amenity that has fostered growth in the late 20
th century U.S.  Sun, coupled 
with the availability of AC systems,
14 may have given some areas in the South and West 
a competitive advantage but skill appears to be a good substitute.  
 
 This fact may be explained by Jane Jacobs’ (1969) view that cities need to constantly 
reinvent themselves. Specialization in one area may yield brief success but eventually the 
area fades or the city’s comparative advantage in the area decays, and reinvention is 
necessary.  Glaeser (2003) details at least four periods in Boston’s history where the city 
                                                           
14 Alternatively, the weather variable may be capturing the impact of other variables, though the effect of 
weather on population growth holds after controlling for state fixed effects. What matters for our argument 
is not so much the causal impact of weather but the strong predictive power of the part of the signal in this 
variable that is orthogonal to education.   40
reinvented itself. Conversely, in areas with positive exogenous growth shocks human 
capital may have less of a role, since reinvention is not necessary. 
 
In Table 10, we look at this hypothesis more thoroughly.  In regressions (1)-(3), we 
repeat our benchmark specifications for population, housing price, and wage growth and 
focus on the interaction between initial human capital and warmth.  In all three cases, 
there is a statistically significant negative interaction between warmth and initial skills.  
The cross-effect is strongest in the population regressions, where the regressions imply 
that a doubling of the number of heating degree days causes the impact of skills to fall by 
about one-half.  The effect on wages is also statistically significant but smaller in 
magnitude, at least relative to the benchmark coefficient.  The effect on housing prices is 
the weakest.  Although the cross-effect is still negative, it is not statistically significant.    
 
One important omitted factor here is land use regulations, which appear to be tighter 
almost everywhere  there is a high degree of human capital.  This would explain why in 
warm places, skills still matter for housing price growth (because skills are correlated 
with less elastic housing supply), but not much for population growth.  Indeed, if there is 
a correlation between skills and inelastic housing supply, this would tend to create a 
perverse negative effect where more skilled places actually grow less, despite increasing 
demand for these areas.   
 
In regressions (4)-(6), we look at the share of the population (in the initial time period) 
that is composed of immigrants. Over this time period, immigration was a large source of   41
urban growth, and immigrants tend to settle where other immigrants live (Altonji and 
Card, 1991, Saiz, 2003). If the reinvention hypothesis is correct,  we should expect to see 
that human capital doesn’t matter in places with large supplies of immigrants, but it 
should be important in areas where immigrants are not coming.  Indeed, this is exactly 
what we find in regression (4).  Human capital matters much more in predicting 
population growth in areas without immigrants than in areas with immigrants.  One 
possible explanation for the strikingly different correlation between skills and growth in 
growing and declining places is that skills allow reinvention.  The view that human 
capital is most valuable because it enables flexibility and the ability to respond to new 
circumstances was emphasized by Welch (1970).  If this view is correct, we should not 
be surprised if a high skill New England city manages to reinvent itself while a low skill 
Rustbelt town does not. 
 
One implication of this hypothesis is that places with high human capital should be better 
at switching out of declining industries.  To test this hypothesis, we gathered data on 
education and industrial composition in 1940 by metropolitan area (contemporaneously 
defined).  We then tested whether the impact of skills on contributing to the shift away 
from manufacturing over the next 30 years has been more important in industrial, colder 
areas of the country (Table 10, panel B).  The regressions support the view that the 
skilled Rustbelt towns were better at reorienting themselves: the importance of education 
to explain the shift away from manufacturing (the change in the manufacturing share on 
the left-hand side) in the second half of the 20
th century was stronger in colder areas   42
(interaction between human capital and temperature) and in areas with an initially bigger 
share of manufacturing (interaction between education and share manufacturing). 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
 
Human capital predicts population and productivity growth at the city and metropolitan 
area level as surely as it predicts income growth at the country level.  High skill areas 
have been getting more populous, better paid, and more expensive.  Indeed, aside from 
climate, skill composition may be the most powerful predictor of urban growth.  This is 
both a boon to the skilled cities that have done spectacularly over the past two decades 
and a curse to the cities with less skilled workers that have suffered an almost 
unstoppable urban decline. 
 
Why do skilled cities grow more quickly?  At the metropolitan area level, the available 
evidence appears to show quite clearly that skills predict productivity growth and not an 
increase in amenity levels.  The high skilled metropolitan areas are not seeing falling real 
wages.  To the contrary, prices seem not to be rising quickly enough to offset the 
increases in wages.  Standard economic reasoning tells us that this means that high skill 
levels are associated with decreasing levels of quality of life, perhaps because of 
increasing population levels.   
 
Within metropolitan areas, at the very local level, there is some evidence that the prices 
of skilled places have risen sharply.  If the standard assumption that a metropolitan area is 
a single labor market holds, then the skills-housing price growth connection is best   43
understood as suggesting that skills increase amenities at the very local level, if not at the 
metropolitan area level.  Thus, our results suggest that skills are important because they 
increase productivity at the metropolitan level and amenities at the local.  On net, the 
productivity effects appear to be much stronger.   
 
Why are skills so strongly associated with productivity growth at the metropolitan level? 
Certainly skilled cities are more innovative, but controlling for the rate of innovation 
doesn't impact the effect of skills.  One clue may be the fact that skills are much more 
important in otherwise disadvantaged regions than in exogenously growing regions.  This 
fact might reflect the idea that cities are constantly reinventing themselves - moving from 
one field of specialization to another.  Skills may well be a crucial part of this reinvention 
process as skilled workers react more speedily to painful economic shocks and educated 
workers find it easier to switch techniques (as in Welch, 1970).  While at this point the 
reinvention hypothesis is only a guess, the fact that skills are so important in the 
Northeast and almost irrelevant in the West suggests there is something very significant 
about the connection between skills and the process of urban decline.     
 
The results in the paper suggest that city growth can be increased with strategies that 
increase the level of local human capital.  At the regional or metropolitan level, attracting 
high human capital workers may require provision of basic services, amenities and 
quality public schools that will lure the most skilled.  Conversely, redistributive policies 
at the local level have to be carefully designed as they may have the undesired side effect 
of repelling the skilled and deter growth.  Generating new technologies locally does not   44
seem as important as having the capacity to adapt them.  Providing basic quality 
education (maximizing success rates in high school graduation) may both produce and 
attract the educated.  Since local tax bases are heterogeneous, state and federal funds can 
play a role in avoiding “low education traps” in ailing cities.     45
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 Appendix A:  Data Appendix 
General Notes: MSA data are for metropolitan areas as defined by the Office of 
Management Budget in 1999. We use the county MSA/NECMA definition. In most cases 
we need to aggregate data by county to obtain the appropriate MSA data. City data are 
from the HUD State of the Cities Data System. We select those cities with population 
over 30,000 in 1970, the initial year for which  data are available. 
 
 
Variable Source  Details 
Share of persons 25 or 
older with a bachelor’s 
degree 
HUD State of the Cities 
Data System (Census) 
 
Population  HUD State of the Cities 
Data System (Census) 
 
Average heating degree 
days (1961-1990) 
County and City Data 
Books, 1994 




County and City Data 
Books, 1994 
We match MSAs to the corresponding  major 
city 
Share workers in 
manufacturing 
HUD State of the Cities 
Data System (Census) 
Employment in manufacturing over total 
employment 
Share workers in 
professional services  
HUD State of the Cities 
Data System (Census) 
Employment in professional services over 
total employment 
Share workers in trade  HUD State of the Cities 
Data System (Census) 
Employment in trade over total employment 
Unemployment rate  HUD State of the Cities 
Data System (Census) 
Unemployment over labor force 
Share of  persons 25 or 
older with less than high 
school degree 
HUD State of the Cities 
Data System (Census) 
 
Colleges per capita in 
1940 
Peterson’s College 
Guide (and Census) 
Peterson’s provides foundation dates for all 
colleges in the US. We use the foundation 
date to ascertain if a college was founded 
before 1940. We match the college zip code 
with the pertinent county,  then assign 
counties to MSA using 1999 MSA/NECMA 
definitions. We have used the Department of 
Education IPEDS dataset for 1969-1999 and 
confirmed that attrition bias is not an issue: 
colleges do not seem to disappear from the 
IPEDS sample at a faster rate in stagnating 
metro areas. 
Family income  HUD State of the Cities 
Data System (Census) 
 
Median house value  HUD State of the Cities 
Data System (Census) 
 
Wages Bureau  of  Economic 
Analysis  
Average wage and salary disbursements per 
worker 
Manufacturing wages  Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Average Hourly Earnings in the 
manufacturing industry 
IPUMS wages  IPUMS (Census)   
IPUMS House values  IPUMS (census)     1
Adjusted IPUMS wages  IPUMS (Census)  Obtained as the MSA fixed effects of  
independent cross-sectional regressions 
where we control for age, age squared, 
education dummies, sex, race, Hispanic 
ethnicity, marital status, and veteran status 
ACCRA Price index  American Chamber of 
Commerce Research 
Analysis Data 
A cross section of relative prices for 1970, 
1980 (about 36 observations) and 1990 and 
2000 (about 210 observations) 
CPI-U Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics 
Consumer Price Index - Urban 




HEGIS/IPEDS offers enrollment for each 
institution of higher education. We match zip 
code to counties and add up enrollments for 
all institutions in a metro area 
Murders per 1,000 
population 
National Archive of 
Criminal Justice Data 
Originally from FBI. By county, we generate 
data by MSA. 
Teacher/pupil ratio   NCES Common Core 
of Data 
The data are for 1990. We locate the county 
of each school and aggregate the number of 
pupils and teachers by county. Then we 
aggregate the county data to MSA. 
Museums County  Business 
Patterns (1980, 1990) 
 
Eating and drinking 
establishments per capita 
County Business 
Patterns (1980, 1990) 
 
Motion picture 
establishments per capita 
County Business 
Patterns (1980, 1990) 
 
Health establishments per 
capita 
County Business 






Patterns (1980, 1990) 
 
Membership organizations  County Business 
Patterns (1980, 1990) 
 
Patents per worker  US Patent and 
Trademark Office 
Data on patents by county were generously 
provided by Robert Hunt. We aggregated at 
MSA level. 
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Appendix B:  Additional Calculations 
 
The terms in equation (2) are  ση
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Differentiating again yields: 
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the expression is negative and the impact of φ  on population growth is lower for cities 
with higher levels of  j θ . 
 
 









 Growth 1980-2000  Fitted values








Fitted line from the regression: 
 
 
Log(pop2000/pop1980) =   0.0611 +   1.001 × Share with bachelor’s degree in 1980 
                                            (0.036)    (0.209) 
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Figure 2 






 Univariate regression line  Share Bachelor's degree (2000)









Share with Bachelor’s in 2000 =   0.207 +   1.816 × Colleges per 1,000 population in 1940 
                                                      (0.006)    (0.337) 
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Figure 3 
MSA IPUMS adjusted real wages and human capital (1990) 
 
 
Share with Bachelors degree
 Real adjusted IPUMS wages  Fitted values










Real wage 1990 =    3.436+   0.447× Share with bachelor’s degree in 1990 
                                (0.031)   (0.175) 
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Figure 4 
MSA growth (1980-2000) and human capital (1980). Warm MSAs 














Log(pop2000)-log(pop1980) = 0.615  +   0.242 × Share with bachelor’s degree in 1980 
                                                 (0.429)    (0.072) 
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Figure 5 
MSA growth (1980-2000) and human capital (1980). Cold MSAs 





 Growth 1980-2000  Fitted values










Log(pop2000)-log(pop1980) = -0.064  +   1.317 × Share with bachelor’s degree in 1980 
                                                  (0.031)     (0.175) 
 











 Log(population 2000)-log(population 1970)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) in 1970 0.30
Log population in 1970 -0.13
Log average heating degree days (1961-1990) -0.56
Log average annual precipitation (1961-1990) -0.31
Share workers in manufacturing in 1970 -0.56
Share workers in professional services in 1970 0.22
Share workers in trade in 1970 0.29
Unemployment rate in 1970 0.15
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+) in 1970 -0.18
Log colleges per capita in 1940 0.25
Log family income in 1970 -0.28
Log home value in 1970 0.02
      
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) in 1970 0.18
Log population in 1970 -0.08
Log average heating degree days (1961-1990) -0.44
Log average annual precipitation (1961-1990) -0.45
Share workers in manufacturing in 1970 -0.33
Share workers in professional services in 1970 0.13
Share workers in trade in 1970 0.21
Unemployment rate in 1970 0.11
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+) in 1970 -0.28
Log colleges per capita in 1940 0.25
Log family income in 1970 -0.08
Log home value in 1970 0.07
TABLE 1
1970-200 population growth and 1970 variables: correlations
Panel a: Metropolitan Areas
Panel b: Cities(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.47 0.582 0.456 0.508 0.414
(0.096)*** (0.113)*** (0.117)*** (0.215)** (0.153)***
Log of population at t-10 -0.015 -0.011 -0.316 -0.014 0.003
(0.004)*** (0.005)** (0.030)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)
Log average heating degree days (1961-1990) -0.082 -0.075 -0.084 -0.07
(0.011)*** (0.020)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)***
Log average annual precipitation (1961-1990) -0.026 -0.001 -0.026 -0.024
(0.015)* (0.014) (0.015)* (0.015)
Share workers in manufacturing at t-10 -0.173 -0.167 0.255 -0.162 -0.174
(0.088)* (0.073)** (0.125)** (0.085)* (0.084)**
Share workers in professional services at t-10 -0.328 -0.166 0.148 -0.238 0.082
(0.145)** (0.132) (0.203) (0.142)* (0.117)
Share workers in trade at t-10 0.034 0.113 0.229 0.007 -0.129
(0.260) (0.215) (0.281) (0.279) (0.219)
Unemployment rate at t-10 -0.427
(0.235)*
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+) at t-10 -0.06
(0.089)
Log colleges per capita in 1940 0.035
(0.008)***
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effects no yes no no yes yes
State fixed effects no no yes no no no
MSA Fixed effects no no no yes no no
Observations 918 918 918 954 918 816
R-squared 0.56 0.51 0.6 0.89 0.51 0.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 2
MSA growth and education
∆log(population)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.202 0.217 0.166 0.121 0.061
(0.044)*** (0.053)*** (0.050)*** (0.086) (0.078)
Log of population at t-10 -0.009 -0.017 -0.512 -0.007 -0.010
(0.004)** (0.005)*** (0.017)*** (0.004) (0.004)**
Log average heating degree days (1961-1990) -0.021 0.000 -0.023 -0.028
(0.009)** (0.015) (0.009)*** (0.009)***
Log average annual precipitation (1961-1990) -0.097 -0.071 -0.097 -0.087
(0.018)*** (0.025)*** (0.019)*** (0.021)***
Share workers in manufacturing at t-10 -0.032 -0.023 0.327 0.014 -0.042
(0.060) (0.059) (0.091)*** (0.063) (0.055)
Share workers in professional services at t-10 -0.113 -0.095 -0.851 -0.048 0.029
(0.090) (0.087) (0.144)*** (0.102) (0.077)
Share workers in trade at t-10 0.276 0.122 -0.393 0.181 0.200
(0.151)* (0.154) (0.164)** (0.154) (0.149)
Unemployment rate at t-10 -0.043
(0.200)
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+) at t-10 -0.163
(0.060)***
Log colleges per capita in 1940 0.033
(0.007)***
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effects no yes no no yes yes
State fixed effects no no yes no no no
City Fixed effects no no no yes no no
Observations 2160 2160 2160 2169 2160 2070
R-squared 0.11 0.26 0.36 0.8 0.27 0.26
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 3
City growth and education
∆log(population)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spline growth for declining areas 0.058 0.055 -0.311 0.121 0.087 1.249
(0.014)*** (0.016)*** (0.203) (0.024)*** (0.020)*** (1.996)
Spline growth for growing areas 0.011 -0.005 0.057 0.010 0.022 -0.155
(0.005)** (0.006) (0.065) (0.007) (0.007)*** (0.103)
Log of population at t-10 0.000 -0.001 0.007 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Share workers in manufacturing at t-10 -0.048 -0.063 0.023 -0.079
(0.013)*** (0.017)*** (0.011)** (0.031)**
Share workers in professional services at t-10 0.074 0.069 0.138 0.060
(0.021)*** (0.023)*** (0.016)*** (0.051)
Share workers in trade at t-10 -0.081 -0.086 0.033 -0.038
(0.037)** (0.045)* (0.034) (0.054)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
IV for growth (wheather instruments) no no yes no no yes
Observations 2709 2169 2160 954 954 918
R-squared 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.42
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
∆share bachelors
TABLE 4
Reverse causation: human capital and growth
MSA Cities(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.185 1.166 2.324 2.258 0.902
(0.083)** (0.186)*** (0.237)*** (0.518)*** (0.220)***
Log median house value at t-10 -0.417 -0.71 -1.183 -0.422 -0.333
(0.036)*** (0.041)*** (0.060)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)***
Unemployment rate at t-10 -0.881
(0.344)**
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+) at t-10 -0.053
(0.109)
Log colleges per capita in 1940 0.032
(0.012)***
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.226 1.619 2.25 1.869 1.097
(0.045)*** (0.116)*** (0.118)*** (0.222)*** (0.151)***
Log median house value at t-10 -0.376 -0.602 -1.096 -0.41 -0.169
(0.024)*** (0.029)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)*** (0.017)***
Unemployment rate at t-10 -1.483
(0.279)***
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+) at t-10 -0.377
(0.083)***
Log colleges per capita in 1940 -0.002
(0.008)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.191 0.761 0.849 1.769 0.59
(0.029)*** (0.082)*** (0.090)*** (0.171)*** (0.090)***
Log average family income at t-10 -0.291 -0.359 -1.155 -0.336 -0.143
(0.029)*** (0.036)*** (0.043)*** (0.030)*** (0.025)***
Unemployment rate at t-10 -0.307
(0.161)*
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+) at t-10 -0.186
(0.054)***
Log colleges per capita in 1940 0.019
(0.004)***
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.275 0.632 0.671 1.624 0.434
(0.020)*** (0.052)*** (0.056)*** (0.094)*** (0.057)***
Log average family income at t-10 -0.135 -0.167 -1.091 -0.231 0.042
(0.016)*** (0.020)*** (0.031)*** (0.020)*** (0.009)***
Unemployment rate at t-10 -0.709
(0.118)***
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+) at t-10 -0.313
(0.041)***
Log colleges per capita in 1940 0.015
(0.003)***
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effects no yes no no yes yes
State fixed effects no no yes no no no
MSA Fixed effects no no no yes no no
Other variables in Table 2 yes yes yes yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
PANEL C: ∆log(average MSA family income)
PANEL D: ∆log(average city family income)
TABLE 5
Education, home value and income growth
PANEL A: ∆log(MSA median house value)





Share bachelor's at t-10*1980 Dummy 0.527 0.389
(0.459) (1.550)
Share bachelor's at t-10*1990 Dummy 0.738 2.205
(0.347)** (1.087)**
Share bachelor's at t-10*2000 Dummy 0.785 1.698
(0.271)*** (0.855)**
MSA fixed effects yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes
Observations 1026867 1222890
R-squared 0.33 0.64
Average growth in education effect per decade 0.26 0.57
Wage regressions include year and MSA fixed effects, controls for age, age squared, 
education dummies interacted with year, race, Hispanic ethnicity, marital status, and 
veteran status. Observations include males of age over 21 with complete observations.
Value regressions include year and MSA fixed effects, controls for number of rooms and 
bedrooms, quality of plumbing and kitchen facilties, and age of the building. The results to 
a 50% random sample of the IPUMS data for all single units with the relevant information.
TABLE 6
Human capital and wage/value growth: IPUMS
Robust standard errors clustered by MSA-year in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.78 1.78 -0.003 0.213 0.045 0.057
(0.217)*** (0.239)*** (0.178) (0.297) (0.088) (0.144)
Log of population at t-10 -0.03 -0.018 -0.018
(0.011)*** (0.010)* (0.005)***
Log average heating degree days (1961-1990) -0.033 0.028 0.011
(0.024) (0.024) (0.007)
Log average annual precipitation (1961-1990) -0.03 0.024 0.031
(0.029) (0.040) (0.014)**
Share workers in manufacturing at t-10 -0.029 0.188 -0.069
(0.212) (0.182) (0.080)
Share workers in professional services at t-10 -1.362 0.203 -0.08
(0.318)*** (0.389) (0.177)
Share workers in trade at t-10 2.063 0.505 0.262
(0.505)*** (0.476) (0.371)
Decade fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effects no no no no no no
Observations 238 234 135 135 130 129
R-squared 0.11 0.37 0.06 0.22 0.58 0.64
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: We use Boston in 1990 as baseline, the evolution of Urban CPI and of relative prices from Accra to calculate prices by MSA and
year.
TABLE 7







wage/Accra prices)(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.179 0.49
(0.031)*** (0.035)***
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+) at t-10 -0.274 -0.079
(0.028)*** (0.025)***
Log of population at t-10 -0.03 -0.029 -0.019 -0.019
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Share workers in manufacturing at t-10 -0.12 -0.068 -0.099 -0.105
(0.045)*** -0.045 (0.026)*** (0.027)***
Share workers in professional services at t-10 -0.512 -0.518 -0.264 0.033
(0.059)*** (0.053)*** (0.041)*** -0.034
Share workers in trade at t-10 -0.245 -0.363 -0.143 -0.249
(0.080)*** (0.082)*** (0.049)*** (0.051)***
Log median value at t-10 -0.111 -0.019
(0.012)*** (0.011)*
Decade fixed effects yes yes yes yes
MSA-Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 13752 13752 13645 13645
Minor civil divisions 4584 4584 4584 4584
R-squared 0.24 0.25 0.59 0.59
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 8
Within MSA regressions:  minor civil divisions within MSA
∆log(population) ∆log(median value)Log patents per 
worker
(1) (2) (3)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 9.135 0.781
(0.903)*** (0.119)***
Log patents per worker at t-10 0.02 0.003
(0.006)*** (0.006)
Log of population at t-10 0.156 0.001 -0.011
(0.040)*** (0.005) (0.005)**
Log average heating degree days (1961-1990) -0.208 -0.026 -0.037
(0.080)*** (0.010)** (0.010)***
Log average annual precipitation (1961-1990) -0.014 -0.038 -0.05
(0.107) (0.017)** (0.018)***
Share workers in manufacturing at t-10 5.894 -0.226 -0.047
(0.740)*** (0.109)** (0.122)
Share workers in professional services at t-10 -0.485 -0.213 -0.756
(1.341) (0.157) (0.162)***
Share workers in trade at t-10 1.832 -0.229 0.232
(2.367) (0.287) (0.297)
Region fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 304 304 304
R-squared 0.56 0.38 0.46
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 9






Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.945 2.541 1.264 0.999 2.203 1.046
(0.138)*** (0.230)*** (0.209)*** (0.135)*** (0.226)*** (0.204)***
Temperature * Share bachelors' at t-10 -0.396 -0.284 -0.121
(0.112)*** (0.137)** (0.133)
Log of population at t-10 -0.013 0.424 0.04 -0.013 0.442 0.038
(0.004)*** (0.051)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.052)*** (0.007)***
Log average heating degree days (1961-1990) -0.143 -0.075 -0.06 -0.093 -0.052 -0.021
(0.022)*** (0.026)*** (0.023)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)
Log average annual precipitation (1961-1990) -0.027 -0.015 0.063 -0.026 -0.031 0.078
(0.015)* (0.018) (0.017)*** (0.016)* (0.019)* (0.020)***
Share workers in manufacturing at t-10 -0.128 -0.151 0.138 -0.145 -0.185 0.074
(0.087) (0.115) (0.114) (0.082)* (0.109)* (0.112)
Share workers in professional services at t-10 -0.295 -1.266 -0.139 -0.456 -1.267 -0.198
(0.145)** (0.207)*** (0.178) (0.143)*** (0.210)*** (0.180)
Share workers in trade at t-10 -0.004 0.088 0.119 -0.05 0.078 0.103
(0.257) (0.336) (0.307) (0.252) (0.333) (0.304)
Log Average Wage Receipts per Worker at t-10 -0.403 -0.417
(0.047)*** (0.048)***
Log median house value at t-10 -0.414 -0.466
(0.036)*** (0.042)***
Share immigrant at t-10 * Share bachelor's t-10 -5.751 2.376 3.433
(1.201)*** (1.897) (2.142)
Share immigrant at t-10 0.704 -0.901 -0.031
(0.268)*** (0.352)** (0.409)
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 918 918 918 918 918 918






Share bachelors in 1940 -0.011 0.094
(0.006)* (0.017)***
Share in manufacturing in 1940 -0.547 -0.139
(0.084)*** (0.028)***
January mean temperature -0.002 0.032
(0.0008)** (0.002)***
Share manufacturing 1940 * Share bachelors in 1940 -0.048 -0.309
(0.018)** (0.058)***
January mean temperature * Share bachelors in 1940 0.0003 0.046
(0.0001)* (0.29)






Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel A: Temperature =9.27-log(heating degree days); 9.27 corresponds to the city with max(log heating degree days)
TABLE 10
The "reinvention" hypothesis




Share bachelors in 1940
Log(population) in 1940
January mean temperature
Log average annual precipitation 
Share in manufacturing in 1940
ConstantMean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log population- Log population at t-10 n.a n.a 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.10
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) 0.11 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.20 0.06 0.24 0.07
Population 504,782.90 970,639.80 560,354.40 981,159.50 626,707.90 1,073,780.00 712,948.90 1,197,389.00
Average heating degree days (1961-1990) 4,453.08 2,192.30 4,453.08 2,192.30 4,453.08 2,192.30 4,453.08 2,192.30
Average annual precipitation (1961-1990) 36.67 13.89 36.67 13.89 36.67 13.89 36.67 13.89
Share workers in manufacturing  0.23 0.11 0.21 0.09 0.17 0.07 0.14 0.07
Share workers in professional services  0.19 0.06 0.21 0.05 0.24 0.05 n.a n.a
Share workers in trade  0.21 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.16 0.02
Unemployment rate 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+)  0.46 0.09 0.32 0.08 0.24 0.07 0.18 0.06
Colleges per 1,000 people in 1940 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Home value  16,022.64 4,189.95 47,255.97 15,616.03 79,504.72 45,484.25 115,785.20 53,119.58
Median family income 9,170.65 1,480.34 19,585.52 2,807.46 34,153.75 6,101.29 48,929.87 8,360.88
N=318
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log population- Log population at t-10 n.a n.a 0.03 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.13
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.10 0.22 0.12 0.26 0.14
Population 118,794.40 363,363.60 119,624.10 334,524.10 127,120.60 348,124.00 138,225.50 378,873.30
Average heating degree days (1961-1990) 4,460.59 2,123.92 4,460.59 2,123.92 4,460.59 2,123.92 4,460.59 2,123.92
Average annual precipitation (1961-1990) 35.00 12.80 35.00 12.80 35.00 12.80 35.00 12.80
Share workers in manufacturing  0.26 0.12 0.23 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.14 0.07
Share workers in professional services  0.19 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.25 0.07 n.a n.a
Share workers in trade  0.21 0.04 0.21 0.03 0.22 0.03 0.15 0.02
Unemployment rate 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03
Share of high school drop outs (age 25+)  0.43 0.13 0.31 0.12 0.24 0.10 0.20 0.10
Colleges per 1,000 people in 1940 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Home value  19,569.85 7,008.13 54,847.72 26,139.47 113,982.90 81,750.05 146,108.90 103,341.80
Median family income 10,529.60 2,299.21 20,964.24 4,954.75 37,382.61 11,299.83 50,909.85 16,288.94
N=723
1970 1980 1990 2000
MSA
TABLE A.1
Descriptive Statistics for the Main variables
CITIES
1970 1980 1990 2000(1) (2) (3)
Share with Bachelor's degree (age 25+) at t-10 0.686 0.505
(0.134)*** (0.166)***
Log of population at t-10 -0.003 -0.019 -0.014
-0.004 (0.004)*** (0.008)*
Log average heating degree days (1961-1990) -0.078 -0.09 -0.123
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)***
Log average annual precipitation (1961-1990) -0.02 -0.033 -0.056
-0.015 (0.015)** (0.016)***
Share workers in manufacturing at t-10 -0.31 -0.11 -0.349
(0.086)*** -0.09 (0.103)***
Share workers in professional services at t-10 -0.433 -0.442 -0.299
(0.196)** (0.144)*** (0.185)
Share workers in trade at t-10 -0.187 -0.005 -0.428
-0.237 -0.257 (0.302)




Eating and drinking establishments per capita -1.316
(18.143)
Motion picture establishments per capita 64.137
(187.538)








Murders per 100 inhabitants -3.822
(1.064)***
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Lagged Age Distribution no yes no
Observations 909 915 550
R-squared 0.51 0.6 0.57
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 2
Further robustness tests
∆log(population)